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"Weapons like to Lightning"! 
US Information Operations and 
US Treaty Obligations 
Jeffrey H. Smith and Gordon N. Lederman 
T he increasing prevalence of computers in the world economy creates new opportunities for the US to conduct offensive military operations 
and espionage. However, the US is increasingly vulnerable to computer attack, 
requiring the United States to defend its military and civilian electronic infra-
structure. As a nation committed to the rule oflaw, the United States must re-
main within the bounds of international law in the conduct of both offensive 
and defensive information operations. 
This chapter e:ll..1'lores the opportunities and restraints offered by interna-
tionallaw for the conduct of US information operations. We both summarize 
and critique the 1999 analysis of these issues by the Office of General Coun-
sel, US Department of Defense (DoD), entided "An Assessment ofInterna-
tional Legal Issues and Information Operations" (hereinafter DoD/GC 
Paper).2 The DoD/GC Paper surveys international legal issues ranging from 
the law of war, to obligations under the United Nations Charter, to a host of 
treaties signed by the United States. This chapter will explore the impact of 
US international obligations concerning outer space, international communi-
cations, and other issues on the conduct of information operations. It will not 
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address the law of war3 or the UN Charter,4 as they are addressed elsewhere 
in this "Blue Book."5 
First, this chapter provides a general overview of the development and con-
duct of information operations. Second, it briefly outlines the structure of inter-
national law, including the existence of treaties and the formation of customary 
international law. Third, US obligations under international law regarding the 
use of outer space and the impact of these obligations on the conduct of inform a-
tion operations are examined. Fourth, we will explore treaties and international 
agreements related to the international communications network and their im-
pact on US information operations. Fifth, a survey of possible treaties and other 
US obligations under international law is offered as a checklist for military com-
manders and officials deciding whether to authorize a particular information op-
eration. The chapter concludes by offering some thoughts on the merits of an 
international treaty concerning information operations. In sum, the interna-
tionallegal obligations analyzed herein complicate US information operations 
but present no insurmountable barriers to them.6 
It must also be understood that any information operation may well be taken 
under the extreme pressure of international conflict, without adequate time to 
weigh all of the legal and political considerations that ought to be considered. 
Consequendy, careful thought must be given to the host of problems raised by 
these emerging technologies. Moreover, the rate of change in the information 
technology world means that the legal and political questions presented may be 
dramatically altered by new technological developments. 
In addition, information warfare presents an interplay between domestic and 
international law not previously seen. For example, the authority of the United 
States to detect, track, and respond to an information operation is driven as 
much by the law governing electronic surveillance of US citizens as by interna-
tionallaw governing the use of force. Similarly, the questions of what legal au-
thority authorizes an agency to act-and which agency-are very difficult 
questions. Although beyond the scope of this chapter, these questions must also 
be answered well in advance of an international crisis. 
Finally, it may be difficult to determine whether an information operation is a 
hostile attack or a criminal act. This ambiguity raises a multitude of questions 
about how the US should respond to such an event. Furthermore, a response 
from the US may have unintended consequences, as decision-makers may 
not be able to predict the collateral damage that may result. An information op-
eration against one nation's infrastructure may have collateral damage, such as 
destroying bank records, that is much more severe than was intended. Given the 
interconnectivity of the Internet, a US information operation may blowback 
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into the United States. Such a possibility raises several questions concerning the 
privacy and rights of US citizens. 
In sum, information operations present many complex legal and operational 
issues. To first address them in the heat of an information operation is to risk an-
swering them inappropriately. 
The Emergence of Information Operations as a Weapon in the Arsenal of 
Democracy and as a Threat to Democracy Itself 
The benefits of increased efficiency and greater speed brought by the infusion 
of computer technology-particularly the Internet-into the modem economy 
come at the price of increased vulnerability to disruption and economic ruin as 
the result of a computer attack? The United States, as the world's most techno-
logically advanced nation, is best situated to develop mechanisms that import 
information technology into weapons systems8 and to exploit other countries' 
reliance on information technology. Simultaneously, however, the United 
States itselfis vulnerable to economic paralysis resulting from the crippling of 
key US information technology systems. Indeed, as the Federal Bureau ofIn-
vestigations' former information technology security director, Jim Settle, has 
stated, the United States could be brought to its knees within 90 days by 
10 hackers.9 Information warfare could eventually usurp the position ofbio-
logical and chemical weapons as "the poor man's nuclear weapon" because, 
like biological and chemical weapons, information warfare does not require 
sizeable financial investment but, unlike biological and chemical weapons, is 
potentially easier to use-all that is needed for information warfare is a com-
puter and a modem. 
As with any concept of sudden importance, the terms and definitions ofinfor-
mation warfare have yet to coalesce into an established lexicon. The most succinct 
definition of information warfare is offered by Winn Schwartau: "Information 
warfare is an electronic conflict in which information is a strategic asset worthy of 
conquest or destruction."1o The US military uses the term "information opera-
tions," which involves "actions taken to affect adversary information and informa-
tion systems, while defending one's own information and information systems."l1 
The term "information systems" refers to "the entire infrastructure, organization, 
personnel, and components that collect, process, store, transmit, display, dissemi-
nate, and act on information. "12 "Information operations" thus refers to attacks 
against such infrastructure, organization, personnel, etc. 
The military also uses the term" computer network attack," defined as "oper-
ations to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers 
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and computer networks or the computers in computer networks themselves."13 
Information operations include a whole host of weapons, including Electro 
Magnetic Pulse (EMP) and directed energy weapons (such as lasers and high-
energy radio frequency guns). 
Bureaucratic barriers may have obstructed the conduct of US information 
operations during the Gulf War and the Bosnia operations.14 However, the 
United States did conduct information operations in the 1999 NATO air cam-
paign against Serbia. Army General Henry H. Shelton, Chairman of the Joint 
ChiefS of Staff, confirmed that the US used information warfare against Serbia 
during the Kosovo campaign when he stated that "you can assume that we in 
fact employed some of our systems, yes."15 Yet, the DoD's after-action report 
on the air war noted that "the conduct of an integrated information operations 
campaign was delayed by the lack of both advanced planning and strategic 
guidance defining key objectives."16 Indeed, the DoD apparently was con-
cerned about the legalities of full-scale information operations against Serbia, as 
well as the untested nature of the information warfare arsenal; as a result, the 
information operations were apparently constrained. Also, the relative decen-
tralization of Serbian computer systems limited the potential for success of in-
formation operations. US military forces apparently did confuse and disable the 
Serbian air defense system using information operations, but these attacks orig-
inated with electronic jamming aircraft rather than over computer networks 
from ground-based sources.17 
The United States, of course, is a prime target of foreign information opera-
tions. Lieutenant General William Donahue, the Air Force's Director of Com-
munications and Information, reportedly stated that, during the Kosovo air 
campaign, hackers from Chinese Internet addresses targeted NATO networks 
after NATO's accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade.18 
Other countries also recognize the growing and critical importance ofinfor-
mation operations. For example, the Chinese military reportedly recognizes and 
hopes to exploit the potential offered by information operations. On Novem-
ber 2, 1999, Major General Chang Chia-Sheng, director of the simulation cen-
ter under the Chinese Ministry of National Defense, stated at a news conference 
that China would be able to launch information warfare against Taiwan by 
2005.19 An article entitled "Bringing Internet Warfare Into the l\Ililitary System 
is of Equal Significance with Land, Sea, and Air Power," in Liberation AmI}' 
Dail}', the official daily newspaper of the People's Liberation Army's General 
Political Department, reportedly stated that it was likely that another Chinese 
military branch, a so-called net force, would be needed to conduct information 
operations. The article was quoted as saying, "Modem High-Tech Warfare 
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cannot win without the net, nor can it be won on the net. In the future, there 
must be coordinated land, sea, air, space, electronic and net warfare. . . . "20 
Other news reports indicate that China and Taiwan are particularly involved in a 
growing arms race regarding information warfare.21 
Information operations are thus growing in importance for military opera-
tions. It is likely that the United States will utilize information operations in fu-
ture warfare and peace-enforcement operations. Thus, military and civilian 
decision-makers must understand the opportunities and restraints offered by in-
ternational obligations on the conduct of such operations. 
A Brief Survey of the Process of International Law 
Before looking at specific treaties, it is helpful to have an appreciation for 
how international obligations arise. Two principles of international law are 
that, first, sovereign States are equal and independent actors in the interna-
tional system, and, second, States assume legal obligations only by actually 
agreeing to do so. States may enter into international treaties and agreements 
binding the signatory parties. There also exists a body of "customary" interna-
tionallaw, composed of practices that are so widely followed by the majority of 
nations that they are considered obligatory for all. For example, the first satellites 
launched by the Soviet Union and the United States were seen as benign, and 
nations lacked the technological ability to interfere with satellites; as a result, it 
became customary international law that objects in orbit were beyond territorial 
claims of any nation and that outer space was open to all nations. These concepts 
were later embodied in international treaties concerning outer space, which will 
be discussed later in this chapter. As a side note, the development ofinternational 
law concerning outer space contrasts with that concerning aviation, in which 
nations produced a highly restrictive legal structure creating the concept of air 
space and rendering illegal the entrance of aircraft into another nation's air-
space.22 
Countries usually cannot unilaterally withdraw from a treaty unless the treaty 
provides for such an action, and treaties can only be modified by the agreement 
of the parties. It should be noted that both treaties ratified by the Senate and ex-
ecutive agreements entered into by the President are equally binding on the 
United States. Also, many treaties are silent on whether they continue to be in 
force in the event of conflict or hostilities between the signatory parties; this is 
important for discerning whether the US is bound by a particular treaty's obliga-
tions in the event of an outbreak of hostilities and a US desire to conduct infor-
mation operations.23 
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US Information Operations in Space 
International law concerning activities in outer space is critical for informa-
tion operations because outer space is a vital batdeground for information opera-
tions. Space-based systems "perform such functions as communications relay, 
image recollection, missile warning, navigation, weather forecasting, and signals 
intelligence."24 .As a result, US information operations will be aimed in part 
against space-based systems. Such attacks could manifest themselves in attacks 
against ground stations, jamming communications links, or attacking the satel-
lites in space themselves.25 Furthermore, as apparendy occurred during the 
Kosovo air campaign, satellites can be used to relay transmissions that are part of 
a US information operation against a ground-based target. 
Since the first satellite was launched by the Soviet Union in 1957, States 
have signed four major multilateral space treaties: (1) the 1967 Outer Space 
Treaty;26 (2) the 1968 Rescue and Return Agreement;27 (3) the 1972 Liability 
Convention;28 and (4) the 1975 Registration Convention.29 The Moon Agree-
ment of 1979 was not signed by the United States and has in fact only been 
signed by eleven, and ratified by nine, countries.30 Emerging from these four 
major space treaties are several principles concerning the use of space: (1) 
outer space is free for e]'."ploration and use by all States and cannot be subject 
to any claim of sovereignty; (2) activities in space must be done ,vith due re-
gard for the interest of other States; and (3) States that launch objects into 
space are liable for any damage they cause . .As the DoD/GC Paper highlights, 
the rules on the use of force such as the law of war and the UN Charter are 
fully applicable in space. The paper also notes that, while space law contains 
the principle of non-interference with other States' space systems, this provi-
sion might be inapplicable during wartime if the treaties themselves do not re-
main in effect during hostilities.31 
Although these treaties stricdy limit the use of space for military purposes, 
they do not oudaw all military activities per se. Rather, the Outer Space Treaty 
mandates that parties shall not "place in orbit around the Earth any objects carry-
ing nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such 
weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other 
manner" (emphasis added).32 The Outer Space Treaty also prohibits the estab-
lishment of military bases and other types of military activities on the moon.33 
The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty provides that no party may" de-
velop, test or deploy" space-based ABM systems or components.34 .As the 
DoD/GC Paper summarizes, the web of international treaties concerning space 
prohibits the stationing, testing, or exploding of nuclear devices in outer space 
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and the deployment of a space-based anti-ballistic missile capability. However, 
despite the existence of certain limitations, the paper concludes that there is no 
legal prohibition on developing and using non-nuclearweapons in space, whether 
deployed in orbit or via flight from the earth's surface.35 Seemingly, this conclu-
sion appears to open space to information operations. 
Still, the DoD/GC Paper does not explore one possible way in which the 
Outer Space Treaty might ban information operations utilizing satellites. While 
the Outer Space Treaty prohibits" objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other 
kinds of weapons of mass destruction ... or stationing such weapons in outer 
space, in any other manner,"36 it is unclear whether information operations fall 
into the category of weapons of mass destruction. For example, a computer at-
tack against any national computer system of critical importance (e.g., key bank-
ing systems, key medical systems, computer systems controlling dams, oil 
refineries, and other critical infrastructure installations) could wreak "mass de-
s truction" in the sense of widespread loss oflife and prop erty. 37 To the extent that 
a weapon is judged to be a weapon of mass destruction not because it falls within a 
certain category of what is already accepted as a weapon of mass destruction, 
namely, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear, but rather based on the 
weapon's effect, information operations could (if used skillfully) exact a fearful 
toll on both life and property.38 Of course, even if certain information operations 
could constitute weapons of mass destruction, it is unclear what constitutes" car-
rying" or "station[ing]" such weapons on a satellite. If a satellite is used simply to 
relay data from a computer in the aggressor country to a computer in the victim 
country, it is unclear whether such a relay of information would be considered 
"carrying" or "stationing" as defined by the Outer Space Treaty. However, one 
could imagine a situation in which a particular program for information warfare is 
stored in a satellite's computer, waiting for the proper signal or timing for deliv-
ery to a ground-based target. In this case, the Outer Space Treaty could be inter-
preted as prohibiting the use of satellites for information warfare. 
If the erratic development of US policy on anti-satellite weapons is any indi-
cation, policy regarding information operations in space may remain unsetded 
for many years. For example, in the early 1980s, the Air Force developed an 
anti-satellite missile designed to be fired from an F-15 fighter flying at a high alti-
tude. Mter the system was tested in 1985, Congress prohibited the appropriation 
of funds for anti-satellite weapons to be tested against an object in orbit, leading 
to the termination of the program in 1987. Congressional critics of the 
anti-satellite weapons program argued that: (1) outer space should remain free 
from warfare; (2) tests in space of anti-satellite weapons created space debris; (3) 
testing of anti-satellite weapons might interfere with arms control negotiations; 
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and (4) the United States did not necessarily want to encourage other nations to 
develop an anti-satellite weapon system given its own heavy reliance on satel-
lites. In contrast, supporters of anti-satellite programs argued that the United 
States should have the ability to attack opposing States' satellites and should in-
vest in defending its own satellites. 
By the early 1990s, anti-satellite technology had moved away from missiles 
and toward lasers. Congress first prohibited and then later allowed the use of ap-
propriated funds for a test of a laser against an orbiting satellite. In October 1997, 
the US Army tested its MlRACL laser against an aging satellite. While the Army 
tried to construe the test as purely defensive in nature (namely to observe the ef-
fects of a laser on satellites in order to generate information for protecting satel-
lites), a public uproar followed. President Clinton subsequently used his 
then-existing line-item veto authority to strike funds from the fiscal year (FY) 
1998 DoD Authorization Act for projects related to an anti-satellite and space 
control program. Subsequently, following the Supreme Court's ruling that the 
line-item veto was unconstitutional, Congress approved funds for anti-satellite 
weapons in the FY 1999 DoD Authorization Act.39 Accordingly, it is likely that 
the increased use of space-based systems as instruments in information warfare 
will engender criticism from opponents of anti-satellite weapons systems, who 
will argue that the United States should not further militarize space. However, 
the assumption in 1999 by US Space Command of responsibility for information 
operations signals that the military will likely integrate space-based systems into 
information operations.40 
International Telecommunications Law and Information Operations 
International telecommunications law is a web of bilateral and multilateral 
treaties.41 The 1992 ITU Convention42 is the preeminent treaty in this area, 
with over 130 signatories. This convention and others established the In-
ternational Telecommunications Union (ITU) , a specialized agency of the 
United Nations with the authority to formulate telegraph and telephone regula-
tions which become binding legal obligations after formal acceptance by lTU 
members. 
Article 45 of the ITU Convention states that all radio stations, "whatever 
their purpose, must be established and operated in such a manner as not to cause 
harmful interference to the radio services or communications of other Members 
or of other duly authorized operating agencies, which carry on a radio service, and 
which operate in accordance with the provisions of the Radio Regulations."43 
Annex 2 of the Convention defines harmful interference as "interference which 
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endangers the functioning of a radionavigation service or of other safety services 
or seriously degrades, obstructs or repeatedly interrupts a radio communication 
service operating in accordance with the Radio Regulations. "44 The DoD / GC 
Paper recognizes that jamming or spoofing a radio navigation service would vio-
late this provision.45 Therefore, the ITU Convention and the entire telecom-
munications multilateral treaty regime would seem to limit information 
operations that involve interference with radio broadcasting. 
Still, as the paper notes, Article 48 of the ITU Convention provides an ex-
emption for military operations: "Members retain their entire freedom with re-
gard to military radio installations of the Army, Naval, and Air Forces. "46 Article 
48 continues, "[n]evertheless, these installations must, so far as possible, ob-
serve ... the measures to be taken to prevent harmful interference, and the pro-
visions of the Administrative Regulations concerning the types of emission and 
the frequencies to be used, according to the nature of the service performed by 
such installations. "47 The DoD / GC Paper also notes that, in July 1994, the De-
partment of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel relied on Article 48 in deciding 
that the United States could broadcast messages to the Haitian people from mili-
tary aircraft and international air space urging them not to flee Haiti by sea in 
hazardous vessels.48 
The ITC also allows signatory States to interfere with international telecom-
munications in certain circumstances. Article 34 allows members to "stop the 
transmission of any private telegram which may appear dangerous to the security 
of the State or contrary to its laws, to public order or to decency, provided that 
they immediately notify the office of origin of the stoppage of any such telegram 
or part thereof, except when such notification may appear dangerous to the se-
curity of the State. "49 In addition, States may" cut off any other private telecom-
munications which may appear dangerous to the security of the State or contrary 
to its laws, to public order or to decency."5o And finally, Article 35 allows mem-
bers "to suspend the international telecommunications service for an indefinite 
time, either generally or only for certain relations and/or for certain kinds of 
correspondence, outgoing, incoming or in transit, provided that it immediately 
notifies such action to each of the other Members through the medium of the 
Secretary-General."51 The ITC provisions do not state whether the treaty ap-
plies during armed conflict. However, as the DoD / GC Paper notes, there is pre-
cedent that international communications treaties are suspended during armed 
conflict. During World War I, for example, the British Navy cut Germany's ma-
jor submarine cables despite the existence of the 1884 Convention for Protec-
tion of Submarine Cables. It should be noted, however, that the United States 
may have entered into bilateral communications agreements with particular 
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countries that may be relevant depending on the circumstances of a particular in-
formation operation. 
The DoD/GC Paper concludes by stating that "International Conununica-
tions Law contains no direct and specific prohibition against the conduct of in-
formation operations by military forces, even in peace time."52 However, US 
information operations may be carried out not only by military forces, but also 
by intelligence personnel engaged in covert action or other intelligence-related 
activities. Yet, the ITU Convention's Article 48 exemption for military opera-
tions does not appear to allow for such interference in teleconununications by 
non-military personnel such as intelligence operatives. 53 Also, the interna-
tional teleconununications treaty regime contains certain notice provisions, 
and it is unlikely that the military would wish to publicize its information oper-
ations in that way. 
A Checklist of Other US Treaty Obligations 
In addition to international law governing the use of outer space and tele-
conununications, various other treaties and international obligations could im-
pact upon, interfere with, and possibly even prohibit the conduct of US 
information operations. The following discussion is intended as a non-
exhaustive checklist for decisionmakers faced with the question of whether to 
authorize a particular information operation. 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) 
This convention, which is currendy under review by the Senate for advice 
and consent, codifies several provisions of customary international law and cre-
ates new requirements. One such provision of preexisting customary interna-
tionallaw is Article 19, which states that a vessel exercising the right of innocent 
passage through another nation's territorial sea cannot engage in activities "prej-
udicial to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal State."54 Article 19 
defines "prejudicial activities" to include: 
• Any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or 
political independence of the coastal State, or in any other manner in 
violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of 
the United Nations; ... 
• Any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defense or 
security of the coastal State; 
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• Any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defense or security of the 
coastal State; ... 
• Any act aimed at interfering with any systems of communication or any 
other facilities or installations of the coastal State[.]55 
While the DoD/GC Paper observes that LOSC provisions "have the poten-
tial to affect only a narrow category ofinfonnation operations, "56 a literal read-
ing of the LOSC seems to point to information operations falling under its 
purview. Ship-borne infonnation weapons could be classified as "prejudicial to 
the peace, good order or security of the coastal State" because infonnation oper-
ations are "aimed at interfering with particular systems of communication or 
other facilities or installations of the coastal State." The Convention establishes a 
nation's maximum territorial sea as twelve miles from the nation's coast, signifi-
cantly smaller than the 200 miles that particular nations claim. 57 Thus, an obvi-
ous remedy for any legal problems with ship-borne infonnation operations is for 
ships ,vielding infonnation weapons "against" or otherwise "aimed at" a coastal 
nation to stay outside of the twelve-mile limit. It should be noted that the LOSC 
does not expressly address whether its obligations are enforced during an inter-
national armed conflict. 
Treaties on Civil Aviation 
Article 3 (d) of the 1944 Chicago Convention, which established the Interna-
tional Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), states, "The contracting States un-
dertake, when issuing regulations for their state aircraft, that they will have due 
regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft."58 The DoD/GC Paper ob-
serves that, as a result, military aircraft have an obligation of" due regard" for the 
safety of civil aircraft, meaning an obligation "not to interfere with the systems" 
of civilian aircraft, but does not elaborate on this obligation. 
A question thus arises concerning the use of infonnation warfare against 
particular navigational systems or other dual-use systems, i.e., used both by 
military and civilian aircraft. For example, a particular navigational satellite 
might be used both by military and civilian aircraft, or a particular civil-
ian-military airport might use the same radar for both military and civilian 
flights. An infonnation operation against such computer equipment with the 
aim of disrupting military operations could impact civilian aircraft as well, 
leading to a violation of civil aviation treaty obligations. The DoD/GC Paper 
notes that the Chicago Convention specifically provides that the treaty does 
not "affect the freedom of action of any of the contracting States affected, 
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whether as belligerents or as neutrals."59 It also notes that many provisions of 
the convention are inconsistent with wartime circumstances and, therefore, 
the Chicago Convention would be unlikely to survive as a complete entity in 
the event of an armed conflict. However, Article 89 does not provide ade-
quate guidance in ascertaining what provisions of the Chicago Convention 
are applicable during an armed conflict and thus what limitations exist on in-
formation operations in wartime. 
Treaties on Diplomatic Relations 
The 1961 Vienna Convention grants to diplomatic missions the right of in-
violability of the premises and its documents and communications. The con-
vention also requires that diplomatic personnel respect the laws and 
regulations of the State in which they are stationed and that "premises of the 
mission must not be used in any manner incompatible with the functions of 
the mission as laid down in the present Convention or by other rules of gen-
eral international law or by any special agreements in force between the send-
ing State and the receiving State."60 As the DoD/GC Paper concludes, 
"Planning for any information operations activity that involves diplomatic 
premises, persons, archives, documents, or communications, either as an in-
strument or as a target of the operation, must take into account these interna-
-tionallegal obligations."61 . 
Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN) 
These bilateral agreements between the United States and other nations es-
tablish arrangements for tourism, trade, transportation, and other routine and 
practical issues. According to the DoD/GC Paper, such treaties probably would 
be suspended in the event of armed conflict. However, to the extent that infor-
mation operations are utilized in peace-time, decisionmakers must take into ac-
count obligations incurred in FCN treaties to the extent they will impact 
information operations. For example, one could imagine the scenario in which 
the targeted nation will attribute the information operation to criminal elements 
or to economic espionage and will request assistance from the United States un-
der the FCN treaty (or under mutual legal assistance agreements and extradition 
agreements)in response to such information operations. US officials need to be 
prepared to respond to such a request even when the information operation is a 
military or intelligence operation. 
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Status of Forces Agreements and Foreign Domestic Law 
Stationing agreements and defense cooperation agreements memorialize the 
consent of the host nation to the presence of US troops, set limits on troop num-
bers, and identify facilities. The United States also commonly enters into status 
of forces agreements (SOFAs) to address legal jurisdiction over its forces. The 
DoD/GC Paper notes that, by the end of1998, the United States was a party to 
103 SOFAs. Many require that the US notify the host nation of any significant 
change regarding the capabilities or status of the military forces stationed in the 
host country. 
As the DoD/GC Paper states, if authorities intend to conduct infonnation 
operations from US bases abroad, a determination must be made as to whether 
the relevant agreements require notifying the host nation and perhaps even re-
questing its consent.62 The paper also notes that such agreements often require 
that US equipment not interfere with the host nation's communication system 
and that such equipment cannot violate the host nation's laws and regulations. 
Host nations may understandably be concerned about infonnation weapons 
criss-crossing their telecommunications equipment for fear of possible, uninten-
tional infection of the host nation's computers. They might also be wary of the 
counter-measures or acts of self-defense by the target nation of a US infonnation 
operation. Yet, even if a host nation opposed the use of US forces stationed in its 
country to conduct infonnation operations, the difficulty of attributing an infor-
mation operation to its true source might give US forces sufficient cover regard-
ing the origin of the attack, and thus might assuage the host nation's concern 
regarding its own possible vulnerability to counter-measures or reprisals. 
It should be noted that foreign domestic laws impact the conduct of US de-
fensive infonnation operations because foreign law enforcement officials may 
not be authorized to conduct criminal investigations of possible computer crime 
or infonnation warfare unless the conduct at issue constitutes a crime according 
to the laws of that particular country. As a result, officials may not receive the ex-
pected levels of cooperation from foreign law enforcement officials in the inves-
tigation of an apparendy criminal information operation emanating from a 
particular country. Conversely, if a foreign government does oudaw activity that 
constitutes infonnation warfare, US military officials may decide to refrain from 
offensively-oriented infonnation operations conducted from their bases in that 
particular country in order not to subject US forces to liability or culpability for 
violating that foreign country's laws. Furthennore, even if US forces would not 
be liable or culpable legally, commanders may wish to avoid the appearance of 
violating foreign domestic law.63 As the DoD/GC Paper notes, conduct by 
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military personnel that constitutes an offense under the host nation's law and not 
under US law could give the host nation exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute. This 
situation could occur if a host nation's computer law is more developed than US 
law or prohibits particular forms of information warfaie.64 Of course, the flexi-
bility and interconnectedness of the Internet mean that the United States could 
conduct the information operations from a host country that allows such opera-
tions, thus avoiding the particular countries that criminalize such activity.65 
Espionage 
The DoD / GC Paper emphasizes the fact that, given the ambiguity surround-
ing the concept of information warfare, the division between espionage and the 
use offorce is ambiguous. Thus, it may be unclear whether an information oper-
ation constitutes espionage or a military attack-or both. The paper also notes 
that the division oflabor between the intelligence community and the military 
concerning covert action is likely to be blurred by information operations. As it 
concludes, "it remains to be seen how information operations activities will fall 
within this division oflabor," especially when such information operations oc-
cur in the conte:ll..1: of military operations other than war such as peacekeeping, 
peace-enforcement, and counter-narcotics rnissions.66 
An Information Warfare Treaty? 
In October 1998, Russia introduced a resolution in the United Nation's First 
Committee calling for States to report their views concerning the "advisability of 
elaborating international legal regimes to ban the development, production and 
use of particularly dangerous information weapons." The United States respond-
ed that it was premature to discuss negotiating an international treaty concerning 
information warfare. On the one hand, an international treaty serves the interest of 
less-technologically developed nations because the treaty would most likely re-
strict more advanced nations such as the United States from developing informa-
tion warfare techniques. On the other hand, an international treaty need not 
necessarily set restrictions below the level at which advanced nations currendy op-
erate. Such restrictions would be equivalent to arms-control agreements setting a 
limit on number of weapons well-above the number of weapons actually pos-
sessed by signatory States. Furthermore, a treaty limiting information operations 
by nations does not address the problem of terrorists or hackers. 67 
A treaty could potentially ban information operations but allow research on 
information warfare or limit research to defensive capabilities. However, the 
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distinction between offensive and defensive infonnation warfare might blur be-
cause an understanding of offensive operations is required for construction of ef-
fective defenses (and vice versa).68 Alternatively, a treaty could conceivably 
require certain identifYing marks on military infonnation operations so that 
countries can identify the source of operations, although the lack of such attribu-
tion characteristics might be a violation of the current law of war concerning 
perfidy-meaning that a new treaty is not required for this specific purpose. It 
should also be noted that, as a nation advances technologically, it becomes more 
vulnerable to technological attack; in other words, the United States could actu-
ally benefit from an international treaty due to its economy's heavy reliance on 
computer infrastructure. This assumes, however, that the treaty is both ,videly 
adopted and enforceable. Also, the treaty should not leave the United States 
powerless to defend itself against attacks from terrorists or hackers as opposed to 
information operations launched by another State. 
The DoD/GC Paper concludes that "[t]here seems to be no particularly good 
reason for the United States to support negotiations for new treaty obligations 
and most of the areas of international law that are direcdy relevant to infonna-
tion operations. "69 It nevertheless observes that one area in which international 
agreements would be beneficial is cooperation concerning criminal law, namely 
efforts to raise the level of foreign countries' criminal laws concerning computer 
crimes to that recognized by the United States. Although the" DoD/GC Paper 
states that it is unclear how such a treaty could actually work in practice, it also 
speculates that a treaty concerning information terrorism might be useful. 
Conclusion 
The DoD/GC Paper states that there are no "show-stoppers" in international 
law prohibiting US information operations.7o However, obligations concerning 
the use of outer space may present problems if a particular information operation 
qualifies as a "weapon of mass destruction." Furthennore, other obligations under 
international law present complications-and opportunities-for the conduct of 
US infonnation operations. Decisionmakers must be sure to assess the impact of 
international law on each proposed information operation. 
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